In the Face of Growing Threats, Japan Ramps Up Defense Spending
bigger defense budget will enable Japan to better manage Chinese and North Korean threats, thus alleviating the United States’ security burden in the region.
But Tokyo’s efforts to build a more formidable military could also prevent a rapprochement with South Korea. On June 10, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged to increase defense spending from 1% of the country's GDP to 2% over the next five years. The increase is outlined in the 2023 economic and fiscal policy guidelines that Kishida’s cabinet adopted on June 7, and comes after a May 27 meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden in which Kishida promised to "substantially increase" Japan's defense budget. In the face of growing threats from nearby China and North Korea, Kishida appears poised to maintain his predecessor’s efforts to boost Japan’s offensive capabilities and operate beyond the pacifist constraints of Japan’s post-war constitution. This will see leaders in Tokyo continue to expand the role of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), as well as add new preemptive missile and air strike capabilities, change the rules regarding arms sales abroad, and conduct more bilateral military exercises with U.S. forces.
Japan’s increased military budget will bring it in line with NATO’s spending commitment, which requires members to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense. Japan is technically not obligated to reach this benchmark since it is not a member of the Western security alliance, but many of Tokyo’s top allies are — namely, the United States. This will give Japan more political clout on the international stage when it calls for more military and security actions against North Korea.
Japan does not have a standing army, only the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), in accordance with Article 9 of the country’s constitution. The article renounces war and nominally requires Japan to possess only a defensive military capacity to avoid a repeat of the imperial actions that led to World War II by expressly forbidding “the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”
In September 2020, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced Japan would seek to develop preemptive first strike capabilities, noting that Japan’s traditional focus on reactive capabilities — in which Tokyo intercepts missiles only after they are launched — may be insufficient to deter rising regional threats. In February, Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi defended the idea of a Japanese preemptive strike against hostile forces using missiles or jets in what was seen as a direct warning to Chinese and North Korean forces.
As Japan expands its military to counter rising regional threats from North Korea and China, Beijing will have to factor in a new risk regarding a potential Taiwanese conflict. Japan will use its larger military budget to increase the size and scope of the JSDF, as well as procure new U.S.-made Patriot missile systems, cargo planes, surveillance aircraft, utility helicopters, to counter Chinese and North Korean naval forces. Tokyo will also seek to secure new ballistic missile technologies aimed at preemptively striking Chinese or North Korean targets amid Beijing’s increasing aggression toward nearby Taiwan and Pyongyang’s continued ballistic missile tests near Japanese waters. China’s bellicose rhetoric toward Taiwan, in particular, and its continued incursions in the island’s airspace and maritime territory are increasing the risk of a greater U.S.-China conflict that Japan would likely be pulled into, given Japan’s proximity to Taiwan and the fact that it houses a large U.S. military base in Okinawa that could become a target for Chinese attacks. Japan is unlikely to use its larger military budget to engage in offensive operations, which remain will largely unpopular among Japanese citizens due to fears of stoking memories of Japanese imperialism in the region. But while Tokyo will seek to avoid directly attacking North Korea or China, having the ability to do so could still help deter pressing threats to its territory and sovereignty. The potential for Japanese forces to augment Western forces in the region rather than just function primarily as a staging area for U.S. and U.S.-allied troops will now need to factor into China’s calculus a greater Taiwanese conflict by increasing the potential risk and complications of such a conflict.
The 2023 basic economic and fiscal policy guidelines that Kishida’s cabinet recently adopted specifically mention peace in the Taiwanese Strait as a driving factor in increasing defense spending.
In September 2017, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that flew over Hokkaido (the northernmost main island of Japan) and landed 500 miles east of the island. Between January and May 2022, North Korea conducted a record 17 ballistic missile tests, all of which landed in the waters between North Korea and Japan.
On May 20, satellite imagery showed China’s army had built dummy aircraft for training and target practice, modeled after the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force E-767 reconnaissance and communications aircraft stationed at Okinawa — roughly 400 miles northwest of Taiwan. This indicates that China intends to attack Okinawa during any Taiwanese invasion scenario.
On June 5, North Korea conducted eight short-range ballistic missile tests. In response, Japanese and U.S. forces conducted bilateral military exercises.
On May 4, at a meeting in Arlington, Virginia, U.S. forces welcomed the notion of Japan developing a first-strike capability to attack hostile targets via missiles or fast aircraft, on hostile targets.
Japan’s new military capabilities will lessen the United States’ security burden in Northeast Asia by shifting the two countries’ traditional spear-and-shield dynamic in which U.S. forces serve as the offensive “spear” supported by Japan’s defensive “shield.” As Japan gains operational independence from the United States, it will be able to demonstrate its own military might in response to threats like North Korean ballistic missile launches, without relying solely on American equipment and protection. Additionally, increased counter-missile capabilities will provide Japan with greater assurances against expanding North Korean conventional capabilities, which will give Tokyo more autonomy. A Japan that’s better able to both protect itself and defuse external threats will not reduce the United States’ security interests in the region. It will, however, reduce the need to directly protect those interests by enabling Washington to hand off operations to allied Japanese forces. U.S. troops will no longer need to take the lead in addressing or deterring North Korean threats to Japan and can instead change to providing air or naval support for Japanese forces. And in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, Japan’s new offensive capabilities will enable it to directly aid in Western operations against China as well.
On March 10, JSDF and U.S. forces conducted drills with combat aircraft simulating an assault on an island held by foreign forces, and practicing coordinating U.S. air and naval support with Japanese marines.
Japan’s increased military spending will open old wounds with South Korea and may impede efforts to deepen cooperation with Seoul, which China and North Korea could exploit in their favor. The legacy of Japanese colonialism in the early 20th century is still vivid in the South Korean memory, which means that voters in South Korea could demand their leaders denounce Japan’s remilitarization. This will inhibit close bilateral military cooperation, despite the new South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol promising to restore relations with Japan. China and North Korea could, in turn, leverage this mistrust by utilizing astroturfing social media to peddle the narrative of Japanese colonization in the hopes of discouraging close military cooperation between South Korea and Japan. If these efforts are successful, then the current political and security status quo of icy Japan-South Korea relations will remain, forcing the United States to continue bridging the gap between the two countries.
In 2019, Japan removed South Korea from the “white list” of countries for preferential export licensing, restricting key chemical exports for semiconductors — namely, hydrogen fluoride, fluorinated polyimide and photoresists. The move, which was in response to South Korea’s alleged violations of U.N. sanctions against North Korea, resulted in a trade war that has since rapidly deteriorated relations between Tokyo and Seoul.
South Korean courts continue to hear cases against Japanese companies (and rule against them) for forced labor during World War II. Japanese firms have repeatedly appealed the decisions and refused to pay any settlements, claiming all issues were settled with the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations.
South Korean President Yoon pledged to form closer military ties with Japan, and Foreign Minister Dr. Park Jin has expressed interest in restoring relations as a key pillar of a new defensive framework.
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/ ... e-spendingBe patient therefore, brethren, until the coming of the Lord. Behold, the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth: patiently bearing till he receive the early and latter rain.
Behold, we account them blessed who have endured. You have heard of the patience of Job, and you have seen the end of the Lord, that the Lord is merciful and compassionate.
